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Abstract
This study presents a two-period overlapping-generations model featuring in-
tergenerational conict over scal policy. In particular, we characterize a Markov-
perfect political equilibrium of the voting game between generations and show the
following three main results. First, population aging incentivizes the government
to invest more in capital for future public spending, positively a¤ecting economic
growth. Second, when the government nances its spending by issuing bonds, the
introduction of the balanced budget rule results in a higher public spending-to-GDP
ratio and a higher growth rate. Third, to obtain a normative implication of the po-
litical equilibrium, we compare it with an allocation chosen by a benevolent planner
who takes care of all future generations. The planners allocation might feature less
growth and more borrowing than the political equilibrium if the planner attaches
low weights to future generations.
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1 Introduction
Many OECD countries have experienced a declining fertility rate and increasing life ex-
pectancy over the past several decades (OECD, 2011). These demographic changes have
increased the political power of the elderly in terms of voting, which has been expected
to increase government spending in their favor. An aging population is also expected
to increase the tax burden on the young as a by-product of this political pressure. Al-
though these predictions are controversial (Razin, Sadka, and Swagel, 2002; Gradstein
and Kaganovich, 2004), changes in government spending and the tax burden denitely
aect household savings, which, in turn, are expected to inuence long-term economic
growth and welfare.
Several studies have attempted to investigate the political eects of demographic
changes on government spending and economic growth. Examples include Gradstein and
Kaganovich (2004), Holtz-Eakin, Lovely, and Tosun (2004), Bassetto (2008), Gonzalez-
Eiras and Niepelt (2008, 2012), Tosun (2008), Kuehnel (2011), Iturbe-Ormaetxe and
Valera (2012), and Kaganovich and Meier (2012). These studies all assume a balanced
government budget. In other words, they ignore the possibility of government spending
being nanced by the issuance of government debt. However, each generation might have
an incentive to shift the burden to future generations by issuing government debt. Thus,
from the practical viewpoint of scal policy, analyzing this scenario in the presence of
government debt is necessary.
Several recent studies present politico-economic models of government debt, but they
abstract from economic growth and thus assume no capital accumulation (e.g., see Persson
and Svensson, 1989; Alesina and Tabellini, 1990; Tabellini, 1991; Battaglini and Coate,
2008; Azzimonti, Battaglini, and Coate, 2010; Caballero and Yared, 2010; Song, Storeslet-
ten, and Zilibotti, 2012). Two notable exceptions are Cukierman and Meltzer (1989) and
Arai and Naito (2014). Cukierman and Meltzer (1989) present a politico-economic model
of debt-nanced social security. An intergenerational conict is inherent in their model,
but their focus is on an intragenerational conict on scal policy. Therefore, little atten-
tion is given to the intergenerational conict aected by population aging or to its impact
on economic growth.
Arai and Naito (2014) independently develop a politico-economic model of government
debt and endogenous growth, which is similar to the model introduced in the present
study. However, they focus on the eect of public spending preferences on scal policy and
economic growth, whereas the present study examines the following three issues. First, we
focus on the aging eect on scal policy and economic growth, which is a common policy
issue in advanced countries. Second, we compare the debt-nanced public spending case
with the balanced budget case and investigate the eect of introducing a balanced budget
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rule into the former case on public spending and economic growth. Finally, we characterize
a Ramsey allocation in which a benevolent planner with a commitment technology sets
scal policy over time to maximize the welfare of all generations and compare it with the
political equilibrium outcome to evaluate its normative implication.1
For the analysis, we use the two-period-lived overlapping-generations model of Dia-
mond (1965). We employ AK technology, presented by Romer (1986), to demonstrate
capital accumulation. Public spending is shared by two successive generations, namely
the young and old, and is nanced by a tax on the young as well as by the issuance of
government debt. In each period, tax, public spending, and a new debt issue are decided
by probabilistic voting, as in Lindbeck and Weibull (1987). In particular, we focus on
a Markov-perfect political equilibrium in which the policy variables are conditioned by
payo-relevant state variables, namely the beginning-of-period government debt and cap-
ital in the present framework. This equilibrium concept enables us to demonstrate the
forward-looking behavior of agents who consider this intertemporal eect when voting
(e.g., see Hassler et al., 2003, 2005; Hassler, Storesletten, and Zilibotti, 2007; Forni, 2005;
Gonzalez-Eiras, 2011; Song, 2011).
Based on the aforementioned framework, we rst characterize a political equilibrium
when the government is allowed to run an unbalanced budget. A natural prediction is that
population aging makes the government shift the scal burden to future generations by is-
suing more debt, which thus crowds out capital and decreases the growth rate. However,
the present analysis shows that aging is benecial for economic growth. In particular,
greater longevity leads to a larger weight being placed on future public spending. This
incentivizes politicians to invest more in capital for future public spending and thus pro-
duces a positive eect on the growth rate. The result indicates that the forward-looking
behavior of agents plays a role in determining the growth eect of aging.2
Second, we consider a special case, called the balanced budget case. Here, the gov-
ernment is prohibited from borrowing or lending in the capital market and a balanced
budget is thus required by statute. To consider the role of government debt, we compare
the growth rate in the balanced budget case with that in the unbalanced budget case and
show that the introduction of a balanced budget rule results in a higher growth rate when
the government borrows in the capital market compared with the unbalanced budget case.
As a further analysis, we also consider a vote on scal rules and show that the balanced
1A companion paper to the present study (Ono, 2014) introduces collective wage bargaining into the
present framework and investigates the eects of union power on capital accumulation and scal policy.
2The present analysis of aging is also related to that proposed in Rangel (2003). He demonstrates a
three-period overlapping-generations model where the young and old abstain from voting and only the
middle-aged segment of the population decides on the intergenerational reallocation of resources. Within
this framework, he considers how the aging of the electorate (i.e., the middle-aged population) inuences
the intergenerational reallocation. On the contrary, the present study examines how the conict of voting
interests between two successive generations aects scal policy and capital accumulation.
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budget rule is chosen in an election under plausible sets of parameters.3
Third, to consider the normative implication of the political equilibrium, we charac-
terize the Ramsey allocation and compare it with the political equilibrium. The analysis
shows that the Ramsey allocation might feature less growth and more borrowing than the
political equilibrium if the planner attaches low weights to future generations. The oppo-
site result holds when the planner attaches high weights to future generations. Therefore,
the eciency of the political equilibrium in terms of growth and borrowing depends on
the planner's weights on future generations.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and
characterizes the economic equilibrium. Section 3 characterizes the political equilibrium
without a balanced budget rule. Section 4 characterizes the political equilibrium under the
balanced budget rule and compares the unbalanced and balanced budget cases in terms
of public spending and economic growth. Section 5 demonstrates the Ramsey allocation
and compares it with the political equilibrium outcomes. Section 6 provides a discussion
and extensions of the model. Section 7 concludes. Proofs are given in the appendix.
2 The Model and Economic Equilibrium
Consider an innite-horizon economy composed of identical agents, perfectly competitive
rms, and perfect annuity markets. A new generation, called generation t, is born in each
period t = 0; 1; 2; :::. Generation t is composed of a continuum of Nt > 0 units, which are
identical agents. We assume that Nt = (1 + n)Nt 1: the net population growth rate is
n >  1.
2.1 Preferences and Utility Maximization
Agents live a maximum of two periods, namely youth and old age. In youth, each agent
is endowed with one unit of labor, which is supplied inelastically to rms, and earns a
wage. An agent in generation t divides his or her wage wt between current consumption,
cyt , saving for consumption in old age, st, which is held as an annuity and invested in
physical capital and/or government debt, and the payment of tax, twt, which is quoted
as a proportion of the wage. Here, t is the period-t tax rate on labor income. Thus, the
budget constraint for a period-t young agent is cyt + st  (1  t)wt.4
3The balanced budget rule in the present framework prohibits the issuance of government debt. No-
tably, this rule is stricter than that in Azzimonti, Battaglini, and Coate (2010), who propose a rule
in which debt cannot increase across periods. We adopt this stricter rule to investigate how allowing
government debt aects scal policymaking and economic growth.
4In the present framework, wage income tax is equivalent to comprehensive income tax because labor
supply is assumed to be inelastic and therefore agents earn no imputed income. This property implies
that it does not matter if wage income tax is replaced by comprehensive income tax.
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Agents are assumed to be faced with uncertain lifetimes. In particular, an agent dies
at the end of youth with a probability of 1  p 2 (0; 1) and lives throughout old age with
a probability of p. If an agent dies young, his or her annuitized wealth is transferred
through the annuity markets to the agents who live throughout old age. If an agent is
alive in old age, he or she consumes the return from savings. The budget constraint for
a period-t + 1 old agent is given by cot+1  ~Rt+1st, where cot+1 is consumption in old age
and ~Rt+1 is the return from the agent's savings as an annuity.
Agents consume two goods: private goods, denoted by c, and public spending, i.e.,
particular types of publicly provided private goods, denoted by g. We assume additively
separable logarithmic preferences over these goods. Public spending must be consumed by
all agents in the same quantity; it cannot be provided by a competitive equilibrium market.
The utility of a young agent in period t is written as ln cyt+ ln gt+p 

ln cot+1 +  ln gt+1
	
,
where gt denotes per capita period-t public spending, (> 0) captures the preference
weight for public spending, and  2 (0; 1) is a discount factor.
The expected utility maximization problem of a period-t young agent can be written
as
max
fcyt ;st;cot+1g
ln cyt +  ln gt + p 

ln cot+1 +  ln gt+1
	
s.t. cyt + st  (1  t)wt;
cot+1  ~Rt+1st;
given t; wt; and ~Rt+1:
Solving the problem leads to the following consumption and saving functions:
cyt =
1
1 + p
(1  t)wt; cot+1 =
p ~Rt+1
1 + p
(1  t)wt; and st = p
1 + p
(1  t)wt:
In period 0; there are both young agents in generation 0 and initial old agents in
generation  1. Each agent in generation  1 is endowed with s 1 units of goods and
earns a return of ~R0s 1, which is consumed. The measure of the initial old agents is
pN 1. The utility of an agent in generation  1 is ln co0 +  ln g0.
2.2 Technology and Prot Maximization
There is a continuum of identical rms. They are perfectly competitive prot maximiz-
ers that produce output by using a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb{Douglas production
function, Yt = At(Kt)
(Nt)
1 , where Yt is aggregate output, At is the productivity pa-
rameter, Kt is aggregate capital, Nt is aggregate labor, and  2 (0; 1) is a constant
parameter representing capital share. Capital is assumed to fully depreciate within a
period.
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The productivity parameter is assumed to be proportional to the aggregate capital per
labor unit in the overall economy: At = A(Kt=Nt)
1 . Thus, capital investment involves
a technological externality of the kind often used in theories of endogenous growth (e.g.,
Romer, 1986). This assumption, called AK technology, results in a constant interest rate
across periods as demonstrated below. This approach enables us to obtain an analytical
solution for the model. Thus, we employ AK technology for its analytical tractability.
In each period t; a rm chooses capital and labor to maximize its prots, t =
At(Kt)
(Nt)
1    RtKt   wtNt, where Rt is the rental price of capital and wt is the
wage rate. The rm takes these prices as given. The rst-order conditions for prot
maximization are given by
Kt : Rt = At(Kt)
 1(Nt)1 ;
Nt : wt = (1  )At(Kt)(Nt) :
2.3 Government Budget Constraint
Fiscal policy is determined through elections. Government debt is traded in a domestic
capital market. Let Bt denote aggregate inherited debt and Gt denote aggregate public
spending. A dynamic budget constraint in period t is Bt+1 +Nttwt = Gt +RtBt, where
Bt+1 is the newly issued debt, Nttwt is the aggregate tax revenue, and RtBt is the debt
repayment. We assume a one-period debt structure to simplify the voting strategy space
and to derive analytical solutions from the model.
Let bt  Bt=Nt denote inherited debt per capita and gt  Gt=(pNt 1+Nt) denote per
capita period-t public spending. By dividing both sides of the above constraint by Nt; we
obtain a per capita form of the government budget constraint:
(1 + n)bt+1 + twt =
p+ 1 + n
1 + n
gt +Rtbt;
where t > (<)0 holds when the government imposes a tax on (provides a subsidy to)
individuals and bt+1 > (<)0 holds when the government borrows (lends) in the capital
market. The present analysis allows the government to oer a subsidy and/or loans to
individuals.
Given bt, the elected government in period t chooses the labor income tax t, per
capita public spending gt, and newly issued debt bt+1 subject to the above constraint. We
assume that the government in each period is committed to not repudiating the debt.
2.4 Economic Equilibrium
The market clearing condition for capital is Kt+1 + Bt+1 = Ntst. This expresses the
equality of total savings by young agents in generation t, namely Ntst, to the sum of the
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stocks of aggregate physical capital and aggregate government debt. Dividing both sides
by Nt leads to
(1 + n)  (kt+1 + bt+1) = st:
Since the market for capital is competitive, the following arbitrage condition holds under
perfect annuity:
~Rt+1 = Rt+1=p 8t:
Formally, an economic equilibrium is dened as follows.
Denition 1. An economic equilibrium is a sequence of prices,
n
wt; Rt; ~Rt
o1
t=0
, a se-
quence of allocations, fcyt ; cot ; stg1t=0, a sequence of capital stock fktg1t=0, and gov-
ernment debt fbtg1t=0 with the initial conditions k0 > 0 and b0, and a sequence of
policies ft; gtg1t=0, such that the following conditions are met: (i) the conditions
of utility maximization with the budget constraints in youth and old age; (ii) the
conditions of prot maximization; (iii) the government budget constraint; (iv) the
capital market clearing condition; and (v) the no arbitrage condition.
Under the assumption of a productive externality, At = A(Kt=Nt)
1 , the rst-order
conditions for prot maximization are rewritten as
Rt = R  A and wt = (1  )Akt:
By using the saving function and rst-order conditions for prot maximization, we can
rewrite the capital market clearing condition as follows:
(1 + n)(kt+1 + bt+1) =
p
1 + p
 (1  t) (1  )Akt: (1)
In an economic equilibrium, the indirect utility of a young agent in period t, V yt , and
that of an old agent alive in period t, V ot , can be expressed as functions of government
policy, capital stock, and government debt as follows:
V yt = (1 + p) ln(1  t)(1  )Akt +  ln gt + p ln gt+1;
V ot = ln(kt + bt) +  ln gt;
where some irrelevant terms are omitted from the expressions. The rst term of the young
agent's indirect utility function corresponds to the utility of consumption in youth and
old age. The second and third terms show the utility of rst- and second-period public
spending, respectively. The rst term of the old agent's indirect utility corresponds to
the utility of consumption and the second shows the utility of public spending.
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3 Political Equilibrium
This study assumes probabilistic voting to demonstrate the political mechanism. In each
period, the government in power maximizes a political objective function. Formally, the
political objective function in each period t is given by

t = !pV
o
t + (1 + n)V
y
t ;
where !p and (1 + n) are the relative weights of old and young agents, respectively. In
particular, the parameter !(> 0) represents the political power of old agents. An explicit
microfoundation for this objective function is explained in Persson and Tabellini (2000,
Chapter 3) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006, Appendix). The government's problem
in period t is to maximize 
t subject to the government budget constraint, given the two
state variables kt and bt.
We restrict our attention to a Markov-perfect equilibrium. Markov perfection implies
that outcomes depend only on the payo-relevant state variables, namely capital (k)
and government debt (b). Therefore, the expected level of public spending for the next
period, gt+1, is given by a function of the next period stocks of capital and debt, gt+1 =
G(kt+1; bt+1). By using recursive notation, with x
0 denoting next-period x, we can dene
a Markov-perfect political equilibrium in the present model as follows.
Denition 2. A Markov-perfect political equilibrium is a set of functions, hT;G;Bi;
where T : <++  < ! [0; 1] is a tax rule, with  = T (k; b), G : <++  < ! <++ is
a government expenditure rule, with g = G(k; b), and B : <++  < ! < is a debt
rule, with b0 = B(k; b); such that:
(i) the capital market clears:
(1 + n)(k0 +B(k; b)) =
p
1 + p
(1  T (k; b))  (1  )Ak; (2)
(ii) given k and b; hT (k; b); G(k; b); B(k; b)i = argmax
(k; b; g; b0; g0) subject to g0 =
G(k0; b0), (2), and the government budget constraint,
(1 + n)B(k; b) + T (k; b)(1  )Ak = p+ 1 + n
1 + n
G(k; b) +Rb; (3)
where 
(k; b; g; b0; g0) is dened by

(k; b; g; b0; g0)  !p fln(k + b) +  ln gg+ (1 + n) f(1 + p) ln (1  T (k; b)) (1  )Ak
+ ln g + p ln g0g :
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A new state variable, x, is introduced to solve the problem in a tractable way:
x  (1  )Ak  Rb;
where x represents the labor income less the government debt repayment. By using this
new variable, we assume G(k0; b0) = G(x0)  G((1  )Ak0   Rb0). Then, the problem in
Denition 2(ii) is reformulated as
hG(x); X(x)i = argmax

(1 + n)(1 + p) ln

A  (x  p+ 1 + n
1 + n
G(x)

  (1 + n) X(x))
+(!p+ 1 + n) lnG(x) + (1 + n)p ln g0g (4)
subject to g0 = G(X(x));
where X is a mapping from < to <. The proof of this reformulation is provided in
Appendix A.1.
The reformulated problem implies that we can solve the government's problem and
thus nd policy functions in the following ways. First, we nd solutions to the reformu-
lated problem, g = G(x) and x0 = X(x). Second, we use the solutions, the capital market
clearing condition, and the government budget constraint to nd the policy functions
b0 = B(k; b) and  = T (b; k) and the law of the motion of capital, k0 = K(b; k).
The analysis proceeds as follows. Section 3.1 characterizes a political equilibrium.
Section 3.2 investigates the eects of population aging on the growth rate of capital.
Section 3.3 analyzes the political equilibrium further.
3.1 Characterization of the Political Equilibrium
To solve the aforementioned problem, we conjecture a linear function, g0 = GDebt x0; where
GDebt 2 (0;1) is a constant parameter. Under this conjecture, we solve the problem and
obtain the following policy functions:
G(x) =
1 + n
p+ 1 + n
 (!p+ 1 + n)
(1 + n) f1 + p(1 + )g+ (!p+ 1 + n)x; (5)
X(x) = XDebt  x; (6)
where XDebt is a constant term dened by
XDebt  pA
(1 + n) f1 + p(1 + )g+ (!p+ 1 + n) :
These functions constitute a Markov-perfect political equilibrium as long as GDebt =
f(1 + n)=(p+ 1 + n)g  (!p+ 1 + n)  [(1 + n) f1 + p(1 + )g+ (!p+ 1 + n)] 1.
Policy function (6) states that the wage income less the debt repayment in the next
period, (1 )Ak0 Rb0, depends on that in the current period, (1 )Ak Rb. By using
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the capital market clearing condition in (2) and government budget constraint in (3), we
nd that k0 and b0 are determined as a function of (1  )Ak  Rb. Thus, the ratio b0=k0
becomes constant across periods. The tax rate is determined to satisfy the government
budget constraint in each period. The following proposition formally states the ndings
demonstrated so far.
Proposition 1. Consider an economy without a balanced budget rule. Given k0 > 0
and b0 < (1  )k0=, a Markov-perfect political equilibrium is characterized by the
following policy functions:
 = T (k; b)  (!p+ 1 + n)   (1 + n)
p
1+p
f(1   + p)   (1 + p(1 + ))g
(1 + n) (1 + p(1 + )) + (!p+ 1 + n)
+
(1 + n) (1 + p(1 + )) + (1 + n) p
1+p
f(1   + p)   (1 + p(1 + ))g
(1 + n) (1 + p(1 + )) + (!p+ 1 + n)
 
1   
b
k
;
g = G(k; b)  1 + n
p+ 1 + n
 (!p+ 1 + n)
(1 + n) (1 + p(1 + )) + (!p+ 1 + n)
 f(1  )Ak  Rbg ;
b0 = B(k; b)  p
1 + p
 (1   + p)   (1 + p(1 + ))
(1 + n) (1 + p(1 + )) + (!p+ 1 + n)
 f(1  )Ak  Rbg ;
and the law of the motion of capital:
k0 =
p
1 + p
  +  (1 + p(1 + ))
(1 + n) (1 + p(1 + )) + (!p+ 1 + n)
 f(1  )Ak  Rbg ;
where
b
Ak
=
(1   + p)   (1 + p(1 + ))
A f +  (1 + p(1 + ))g
holds 8t  1. The government borrows (lends) in the capital market, namely b0 >
(<)0, if and only if  < (>)(1   + p)=f1 + p(1 + )g:
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Proposition 1 implies that the model economy has the following two features. First,
b0 < (1  )k0= must hold otherwise the debt repayment (Rb0 = Ab0) would outweigh
the wage income ((1 )Ak0), which implies that the government cannot provide a positive
level of public spending in period 0.
Second, the government borrows or lends in the capital market. Here, the state of
the nancial balance depends on the parameter , representing the share of capital in
production. To understand the mechanism behind this result, recall the policy function
B(k; b) in Proposition 1, which can be rearranged as follows:

(1  )A
1 + p
+R

b0 =
(a.1)z }| {
p
1 + p
(1 + p(1 + )) (1  )A 
(a.2)z }| {
pA
(1 + n) (1 + p(1 + )) + (!p+ 1 + n)
f(1  )Ak  Rbg : (7)
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The expression states that individuals devote a part of their available resources, their wage
income less their debt repayment, (1 )Ak Rb; to saving, denoted by the term (a.1) in
Equation (7). The government uses its scal policy to split the saving into an investment
for the next period stock of capital, denoted by the term (a.2) on the right-hand side, and
buying or selling government bonds, denoted by the term on the left-hand side.
Equation (7) implies that the government borrows (lends) in the capital market if the
saving is greater (less) than the investment in capital. Their relative strength depends
on the parameter , which represents the capital share. If  is low and thus the labor
share, 1 , is high such that  < (1  + p)=f1+ (1+ )g holds, agents earn enough
of a wage income to be able to save. They can then aord to lend in the capital market
and the government becomes a borrower. However, if the capital share is high such that
 > (1   + p)=f1 + (1 + )g holds, the opposite result is true: agents borrow in the
capital market and the government becomes a lender. Therefore,  plays a key role in
determining the government's nancial balance.
3.2 Aging and Growth
Based on the result in Proposition 1, we derive the growth rate of per capita capital,
k0=k, and investigate how this growth rate is aected by population aging, namely a
lower population growth rate and greater longevity of agents. The following proposition
summarizes the result.
Proposition 2. Consider a political equilibrium in the unbalanced budget case.
(i) The growth rate of capital is
kt+1
kt
=
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
p
1 + p| {z }
(b.4)
 +
(b.1)+(b.3)z }| {
(1 + p(1 + ))
(1 + n)(1 + p(1 + ))| {z }
(b.1)+(b.3)
+(!p+ 1 + n)| {z }
(b.2)

n
(1  )   b0
k0
o
A for t = 0
(b.3)z}|{
p
(1 + n)(1 + p(1 + ))| {z }
(b.1)+(b.3)
+(!p+ 1 + n)| {z }
(b.2)
A for t  1:
(ii) The growth rate of capital is increased by a lower population growth rate and greater
longevity.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
The growth rate of capital is constant after period 1 because the model exhibits a
constant interest rate inherited from AK technology. Here, we consider how the growth
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rate is aected by a lower population growth rate and greater longevity. To see the eect,
recall the political objective function 
 given by

 = (1 + n)(1 + p)| {z }
(b.1)
ln

A(x  p+ 1 + n
1 + n
G(x))  (1 + n)X(x)

+ (!p+ 1 + n)| {z }
(b.2)
lnG(x) + (1 + n)p|{z}
(b.3)
lnG(X(x)):
The terms (b.1), (b.2), and (b.3) in the political objective function represent the
political weights on the utility of consumption, the utility of current public spending, and
the utility of future public spending, respectively. These terms correspond to those in
the equation for the growth rate demonstrated in Proposition 2(i). The equation states
that the government allocates the wage income (1   )Ak0 in period 0 and the output
Ak in period t  1 to consumption, current public spending, and investment in capital,
which contributes to the formation of future public spending. In addition, the period-0
allocation is aected by the saving rate, represented by the term (b.4).
The equation shows that the allocation is aected by a decline in the population
growth rate and an increase in longevity. To see the eect, consider rst a decline in
the population growth rate, which has the following implications for economic growth.
A lower population growth rate attaches lower weights to the utility of consumption and
that of current public spending, as observed in the terms (b.1) and (b.2), respectively.
These two terms indicate that a lower population growth rate incentivizes the government
to save more for future public spending and thus promotes economic growth. In addition,
a lower population growth rate increases per capita equipment in the economy|this eect
is observed in the term (1+n) in front of the term (b.3). This additional eect also has
a positive impact on capital accumulation. Therefore, the growth rate increases as the
population growth rate decreases.5
Next, consider the eect of greater longevity on the growth rate. In period t  1,
greater longevity implies larger weights on consumption and public spending for the old, as
shown by the terms (b.1) and (b.2) in the numerator. This incentivizes the government to
use the resources for current consumption and current public spending instead of investing
in capital, thereby producing a negative eect on the growth rate. On the contrary, greater
longevity leads to a larger weight on future public spending as shown by the term (b.3).
This gives the government an incentive to invest more in capital for future public spending,
thereby producing a positive eect on the growth rate. In period 0, the positive eect is
5Note that the term (1+n) in front of the term (b.3) in the political objective function has a dierent
implication from that in the equation for the growth rate. The former represents a weight on the utility
of future public spending, whereas the latter represents the term (1 + n) in the capital market clearing
condition, (1 + n)(k + b) = s. The term (1 + n), representing the weight on the utility of future public
spending, is cancelled out through the calculation of the growth rate.
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strengthened by an increase in the saving rate, as shown by the term (b.4).
The analysis shows that the negative eect through the terms (b.1) and (b.2) is out-
weighed by the positive eect through the term (b.3), thereby resulting in a higher growth
rate. To understand the mechanism behind this result, recall the rst-order condition with
respect to x0:
(1 + n) 
(b.1)z }| {
(1 + p)  1 + n
A  (x  g)  (1 + n)  x0 =
(1 + n) 
(b.3)z}|{
p
x0
;
where the left-hand side denotes the marginal cost of x0 and the right-hand side denotes
the marginal benet of it. As observed in the terms (b.1) and (b.3), given x0 and g, both
costs and benets increase as longevity rises. However, there is an additional eect on
the marginal cost through the term g. Given that g = (!p + 1 + n)x0=pA holds at the
optimum, the government nds it optimal to reduce current public spending in response
to an increase in longevity. This works to increase the disposable income of the young
and to decrease the marginal cost of x0. Because of this additional eect of longevity on
the marginal cost, the eect of longevity on the marginal benet outweighs the eect on
the marginal cost.
3.3 Further Analysis of the Political Equilibrium
3.3.1 Economic and Political Eects of Aging
Thus far, we have considered the aging eect on the growth rate by focusing on the gov-
ernment's scal policy decision. However, aging also aects individual decisions on saving,
which in turn inuence the growth rate through the capital market. For instance, greater
longevity implies that individuals attach a higher weight to their old-age consumption.
This incentivizes them to save more for their future consumption.
To clarify the dierence between the economic and political eects of aging, we briey
present the eect of aging on capital accumulation in the economic equilibrium. For this
purpose, recall the government budget constraint and capital market clearing condition
presented in Section 2. They lead to the following equation of the growth rate for a given
set of policies:
k0
k
=
1
1 + n| {z }
(c.1)

26664
8>>><>>>:
p
1 + p| {z }
(c.2)
(1  ) + 
9>>>=>>>;  (1  )Ak  
1
k
8>><>>:
0BB@ p1 + n| {z }
(c.3)
+ 1
1CCA g +Rb
9>>=>>;
37775
This equation indicates three eects of aging in the economic equilibrium. The rst
eect, represented by the term (c.1), indicates that a lower population growth rate in-
creases per capita equipment in the economy. The second eect, represented by the term
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(c.2), shows the aging eect on capital accumulation through individual saving decisions.
These two eects have positive implications for economic growth. However, the nal ef-
fect, represented by the term (c.3), has a negative implication for the growth rate. A
lower population growth rate and/or greater longevity results in a larger burden on the
young for the provision of public spending, which produces a negative income eect on
saving.
In the political equilibrium, the negative eect through the term (c.3) is oset by
an endogenous choice of spending. However, in the economic equilibrium, the negative
eect remains active since the spending level (g) is taken as given. This suggests that
the negative eect through the term (c.3) might outweigh the positive eects through
the terms (c.1) and (c.2) in the economic equilibrium. In other words, the economic
equilibrium analysis might underestimate the positive eect of aging on the growth rate.
3.3.2 Saving Rate and Economic Growth
The result in Proposition 2 also suggests that the growth rate is aected by the saving
rate. Given that a higher saving rate is associated with a higher discount factor, we here
consider how an increase in the discount factor aects the growth rate through a change
in the saving rate in the short and the long run.
A higher discount factor implies that agents attach a larger weight to the utility of
old-age consumption. This incentivizes agents to increase after-tax income and thus to
increase the level of old-age consumption. For this purpose, they vote for a lower tax rate
as well as for higher government debt issue to compensate for the loss of tax revenue.
The capital market clearing condition indicates that a higher level of government debt
produces a crowding out eect, thereby resulting in a lower level of capital. Therefore,
an increase in the saving rate, which is induced by a rise in the discount factor, creates
a negative growth eect in the short run. However, a higher discount factor gives all
successive agents an incentive to save more for old-age consumption. This promotes
capital accumulation and thus produces a positive growth eect in the long run. In
particular, the positive eect becomes perpetual since the present framework assumes the
existence of AK technology.
4 Balanced Budget Rule
So far, we have assumed that government expenditure can be nanced by issuing govern-
ment debt. In a standard neoclassical growth model, the presence of government debt may
crowd out capital and lower economic growth and may also aect the size of government
spending through the government budget constraint.
13
To understand the role of government debt in the present political economy model,
we focus on a special case in which a balanced budget is required by statute. Here, the
government is unable to issue government bonds and runs a balanced budget in each
period. We compute the government spending-to-GDP ratio and growth rate of the
balanced budget case. Then, in Subsection 4.1, we compare these gures with those in
the unbalanced budget case and investigate how the balanced budget rule aects the
spending-to-GDP ratio and economic growth. In Subsection 4.2, we then consider a vote
on scal rules.
Given the initial condition b0; and assumption of the balanced budget rule, the gov-
ernment budget constraint becomes
p+ 1 + n
1 + n
g0 +Rb0 = 0w0 for t = 0;
p+ 1 + n
1 + n
gt = twt for t  1:
Government expenditure gt is nanced by labor income tax revenue from the young, twt.
The capital market clearing condition is Kt+1 = stLt, expressing the equality of total
savings by young agents to the stock of aggregate capital. We divide both sides by Nt
and substitute the saving function and government budget constraint into the clearing
condition to obtain the law of the motion of capital for a given level of government
expenditure as follows:(
(1 + n)k1 =
p
1+p

(1  )Ak0  Rb0   p+1+n1+n g0
	
for t = 0
(1 + n)kt+1 =
p
1+p

(1  )Akt   p+1+n1+n gt
	
for t  1 (8)
The indirect utility functions of the old and young are now given by
V ot =  ln gt for t  0;
V yt =

(1 + p) ln
 
(1  )Ak0  Rb0   p+1+n1+n g0

+  ln g0 + p ln g1 for t = 0;
(1 + p) ln
 
(1  )Akt   p+1+n1+n gt

+  ln gt + p ln gt+1 for t  1;
respectively, where the terms unrelated to political decisions are omitted from the expres-
sions. By using these functions, we can write the political objective function as

0 = (1 + n)(1 + p) ln

(1  )Ak0  Rb0   p+ 1 + n
1 + n
g0

+ (!p+ 1 + n) ln g0 + (1 + n)p ln g1;

t = (1 + n)(1 + p) ln

(1  )Akt   p+ 1 + n
1 + n
gt

+ (p+ 1 + n) ln gt + (1 + n)p ln gt+1; for t  1:
The objective function indicates that capital is a payo-relevant state variable for period
t  1.
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The government's problem is to choose gt subject to constraint (8), given k0 and b0
in period 0 and given kt in period t  1. Solving the problem leads to the following
proposition.
Proposition 3. Consider an economy with a balanced budget rule. Given k0(> 0)
and b0 < (1  )k0=, a Markov-perfect political equilibrium is characterized by the
following policy functions:
t =
(!p+ 1 + n) + (1 + n)(1 + p(1 + )) Rbt
(1 )Akt
(1 + n) f1 + p(1 + )g+ (!p+ 1 + n) ;
gt =
(1 + n)(!p+ 1 + n)
(p+ 1 + n) [(1 + n) f1 + p(1 + )g+ (!p+ 1 + n)] f(1  )Akt  Rbtg ;
and the law of the motion of capital:
kt+1
kt
=
p
1 + p
 1 + p(1 + )
(1 + n) f1 + p(1 + )g+ (!p+ 1 + n) 

(1  )A Rbt
kt

;
where bt = 0 for t  1.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
As in the unbalanced budget case demonstrated in Section 3.1, the tax rate and growth
rate of capital are constant across periods except period 0. In addition, the solution in
the balanced budget case matches that in the unbalanced budget case if and only if
 = (1  + p)=f1 + (1 + )g. In other words, the solutions match if and only if there
happens to be no debt issue in the unbalanced budget case.
4.1 Comparing the Unbalanced and Balanced Budget Cases
To consider the role of government debt, we compare the spending-to-GDP ratio and
growth rate in the balanced budget case with those in the unbalanced budget case and
obtain the following result.
Proposition 4. Let xjDebt and xjBalanced denote the variable x in the unbalanced budget
case and that in the balanced budget case, respectively.
(i) For t = 0; g0=Ak0jDebt = g0=Ak0jBalanced holds. For t  1, gt=AktjDebt Q gt=AktjBalanced
holds if and only if  Q (1   + p)=(1 + p(1 + )) for t  1:
(ii) For t  0, kt+1=ktjDebt Q kt+1=ktjBalanced holds if and only if  Q (1   + p)=(1 +
p(1 + )).
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Proof. Direct calculation leads to the aforementioned result.
The rst result in Proposition 4 states that the spending-to-GDP ratios dier between
the unbalanced and balanced budget cases. In the unbalanced budget case, the available
resources for the government are given by (1 )Ak Rb, which are smaller (larger) than
those in the balanced budget case when the government borrows (lends) in the capital
market in period t  1. As a result of this dierence in the available resources, the ratio
in the unbalanced budget case becomes higher or lower than that in the balanced budget
case depending on the state of the nancial balance.
The growth rate also diers between the two cases. Government debt crowds out
private investment and thus capital formation when  < (1 +p)=(1+p(1+)) such
that the government borrows in the capital market. However, when  > (1 +p)=(1+
p(1+)) such that the government lends in the capital market, such state lending enables
households to save more, thereby enhancing capital formation. Therefore, the state of the
nancial balance is crucial when evaluating the performance of economic growth.
The case of government borrowing suggests that the unbalanced budget scenario at-
tains lower economic growth than does the balanced budget scenario. This result implies a
negative relation between government debt and economic growth. In other words, higher
government debt is associated with a lower economic growth rate. This model prediction
is consistent with the theoretical predictions in a competitive equilibrium (e.g., Saint-Paul,
1992; Josten, 2000; Brauninger, 2005) and recent empirical evidence (e.g., Reinhart, Rein-
hart, and Rogo, 2012; Kumar and Woo, 2010; Checherita-Westphal and Rother, 2012).
The present study adds to the literature by providing a political economy perspective of
this negative relation, which has not been fully investigated in previous studies.
4.2 Vote on the Rule
The analysis has thus far assumed a given scal rule, namely either the rule where the
government is allowed to borrow or lend in the capital market (Section 3) or the rule where
the government is required to balance its budget in each period (Section 4.1). However,
in the real world, the rule is also established through the political process: some countries
and states adopt the balanced budget rule or something similar, whereas others do not.
For example, the US federal government has no balanced budget requirement in the US
Constitution (Poterba, 1995), while some European countries have another form of the
balanced budget rule such as the Maastricht Treaty criteria (Corsetti and Roubini, 1996).
Therefore, a natural question is under what condition the government adopts the balanced
budget rule rather than allows accessing the nancial market.
To address this question, we consider a vote on the rule in the following way. In each
period, the government proposes the two scal rules (i.e., the unbalanced budget rule and
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balanced budget rule), for a given set of state variables k and b. One of them is chosen
through voting from the viewpoint of maximizing the value of the political objective
function. Second, for a given rule, agents vote on scal policy (i.e., public spending and
debt issue). The model is solved by backward induction. We have already demonstrated
the vote on scal policy for a given set of state variables in Section 3 and Section 4.1.
Based on the result thus far, we can compare the value of the political objective function
under the unbalanced budget rule with that under the balanced budget rule for a given
set of k and b as follows:

jDebt ? 
jBalanced
, (1 + n)(1 + p) ln

(1  )Ak  Rb  p+ 1 + n
1 + n
 gjDebt + (1 + n)  bjDebt

| {z }
(U.1)
+ (1 + n)p ln GjDebt  f(1  )Ak0  Rb0gjDebt| {z }
(U.2)
? (1 + n)(1 + p) ln

(1  )Ak  Rb  p+ 1 + n
1 + n
 gjBalanced

| {z }
(B.1)
+ (1 + n)p ln GjBalanced  f(1  )Ak0  Rb0gjBalanced| {z }
(B.2)
:
The terms related to the utility of old-age consumption and utility of current public
spending cancel each other out because they are identical under the two rules. The
terms (U.1) and (B.1) denote the lifetime utility of consumption, while (U.2) and (B.2)
denote the utility of future public spending. We compare (U.1) with (B.1) and obtain
(U.1) ? (B.1) , b0jDebt ? 0. In other words, the government achieves a higher utility
of consumption by borrowing in the capital market. We also compare (U.2) with (B.2)
and obtain (U.2) ? (B.2) , b0jDebt 7 0: This condition states that borrowing in the
capital market increases the cost of debt repayment in the next period and thus decreases
the next-period level of public spending. Therefore, allowing for an unbalanced budget
creates a trade-o between lifetime consumption and future public spending.
To nd the overall eect of the interactions, we undertake the numerical analysis by
setting p = 0:8;  = 0:9, and  = (0:99)30.6 The result depicted in Figure 1 indicates that
for most values of , the political objective function is higher under the balanced budget
rule than under the unbalanced budget rule. In other words, under plausible values of ,
the balanced budget rule is chosen through voting regardless of the state of the nancial
6The last assumption,  = (0:99)30, implies that each generation lasts for 30 years. For example, the
rst and second periods correspond to ages 25{54 and 55{84, respectively. We also assume a single-period
discount factor of 0.99. Because agents under the current assumption plan over these 30-year generations,
we discount the future by (0:99)30.
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[Figure 1 about here.]
The numerical result in Figure 1 provides some insights into Pareto improvement. For
a given set of k and b, the old are indierent between the balanced and unbalanced budget
rules because the policy functions of public spending are identical between the two rules.
However, the young become better o by shifting from the unbalanced budget to the
balanced budget for most values of . Hence, taking the balanced budget rule in each
period is desirable from the viewpoint of Pareto improvement.
5 Ramsey Allocation
This section characterizes a Ramsey allocation chosen by a benevolent planner. The plan-
ner has the ability to commit to all his or her future policy choices at the beginning of a
period, subject to the competitive equilibrium constraints. These constraints include the
capital market clearing condition and government budget constraint. We compare the
Ramsey allocation with the unbalanced budget case of the political equilibrium demon-
strated in Section 3. Then, we evaluate the normative aspect of the political equilibrium
in terms of economic growth and the government's nancial position.
The benevolent planner is assumed to value the welfare of all households. In partic-
ular, following Farhi and Werning (2007) and Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2012),
we assume that the planner attaches geometrically decaying Pareto weights t to the
utility of each generation t: In addition, the planner's weight on generations is assumed
to reect the cohort size. Therefore, the planner's objective function is given by W =
pV o0 + (1 + n)
P1
t=1 f(1 + n)gt 1 V yt 1, or
W = (1 + n)(1 + p) ln

A 

x0   p+ 1 + n
1 + n
g0

  (1 + n)x1

+ (p+ 1 + n) ln g0
+
1X
t=1
((1 + n))t 

(1 + n)(1 + p) ln

A 

xt   p+ 1 + n
1 + n
gt

  (1 + n)xt+1

+

p

+ 1 + n

 ln gt

;
where the terms unrelated to political decisions are omitted from the expression. We
assume (1 + n) < 1. Given k0(> 0) and b0 (< (1  )k0=), the planner's problem is to
choose fgt; kt+1; bt+1g1t=0 subject to the capital market clearing condition and government
budget constraint.
7The aforementioned result seems to be inconsistent with the cross-country evidence. Many countries
run unbalanced budgets by borrowing in the capital market (OECD, 2014). However, nding the factor
that prevents the government from following the balanced budget rule is left for future research.
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By using a method similar to that applied in Section 3, we can reformulate the afore-
mentioned objective function in terms of xt  (1   )Akt   Rbt and write down the
recursive formulation of this problem as follows:
~V (x0) = maxfg0;x1g

(1 + n)(1 + p) ln

A

x0   p+ 1 + n
1 + n
g0

  (1 + n)x1

+(p+ 1 + n) ln g0 + (1 + n)V (x1)] ;
for t = 0, and
V (x) = max
g;k0

(1 + n)(1 + p) ln

A

x  p+ 1 + n
1 + n
g

  (1 + n)x0

+

p

+ 1 + n

 ln g + (1 + n)V (x0)

;
for t  1. We solve the functional equations based on the guess-and-verify method and
compute the policy functions and growth rate (see Appendix A.5 for the derivation).
Here, we look at the growth rate and state of the nancial balance in the Ramsey
allocation to explore the normative implication of the political equilibrium. The growth
rate in the Ramsey allocation changes from period 1 to period 2, but remains stable after
period 3 at the rate kt+1=kt = A (t  2). The planner's nancial position is determined
in the following way:
b0 ? 0,  7
p
h
1  

1
1    p1+p
i
(1 + n)
h
p
1  + 

1
1    p1+p
i :
Hence, the Ramsey allocation might feature less growth and more borrowing than the
political equilibrium if the planner attaches low weights to future generations. These
lower weights imply that the planner has less incentive to save goods for future generations
through capital accumulation.
6 Discussion and Extensions
The aforementioned results depend on several assumptions. In this section, we briey
consider the role of each assumption and investigate how the results would change if
either of them was relaxed or modied. In Section 6.1, we consider a more realistic case
in which public spending benets dier between generations. In Section 6.2, we compare
the political equilibrium outcome of the present model with that of the model with a
neoclassical production function.
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6.1 Age-dependent Public Spending Benets
We assumed that the young and old benet from public spending to the same degree.
However, in the real world, the young might benet more or less from public spending
than the old. For example, the young benet more from public educational services, while
the old benet more from medical services. To demonstrate such age-dependent cases, we
follow Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2012) and assume the following utility function:
Ut = ln c
y
t +  ln gt + 

ln cot+1 +  ln gt+1
	
;
where (> 0) captures the preference weight of public spending on the old. When  <
(>)1; the young benet more (less) from public spending.
Under this assumption, the political objective function in Denition 2 is modied as
follows:

(x; g; x0; g0) = (1 + n)(1 + p) ln

A 

x  p+ 1 + n
1 + n
g

  (1 + n)x0

+ (!p+ 1 + n)  ln g + (1 + n)p ln g0:
Solving the maximization problem of 
 leads to the following policy functions:
g =
(!p+ 1 + n)(1 + n)
(p+ 1 + n)  [(1 + n) f1 + p(1 + )g+ (!p+ 1 + n)]x;
x0 =
pA
(1 + n) f1 + p(1 + )g+ (!p+ 1 + n)x;
where @g=@ > 0 and @x0=@ > 0 hold. Public spending and the growth rate rise as the
weight  increases.
A higher  results in higher public spending since young individuals attach a higher
weight to public spending when old. In addition, a higher  results in a higher growth rate.
The young attach a higher weight to the utility of old-age public spending. This nding
implies that the government, reecting the preferences of the young, has an incentive
to increase future public spending and thus chooses scal policy to stimulate capital
accumulation. The result suggests that the introduction of dierent preferences for public
spending quantitatively aects scal policy. However, we should note that the main results
are qualitatively unchanged under this alternative setup.
6.2 A Neoclassical Production Function
We assumed AK technology throughout the analysis. This assumption results in a con-
stant interest rate across periods, which enables us to obtain an analytical solution. How-
ever, AK technology ignores the possibility that the interest rate changes in response to
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capital accumulation. Given that current scal policy aects saving and capital accu-
mulation, the government might take into account the intertemporal mechanism between
scal policy and the interest rate through capital accumulation.
To demonstrate the aforementioned eect, we here remove the assumption of AK tech-
nology and instead assume the neoclassical production function given by Yt = A(Kt)
(Lt)
1 :
The gross interest rate is now given by Rt+1 = R(kt+1)  A(kt+1) 1, which is dependent
on per capita capital. Following the same procedure as in Section 3, we can now write
the political objective function as follows:

t = (1+n)(1+ p) ln(1  t)wt+ p lnR(kt+1)+ (!p+ 1 + n)  ln gt+(1+n)p ln gt+1;
where the second term on the right-hand side indicates that the government takes account
of the intertemporal eect of its scal policy choice through capital accumulation. In the
case of AK technology, this term is taken as given.
The rst-order conditions with respect to gt and bt+1 are
gt : (1 + n)(1 + p)
@(1  t)wt
@gt
+ p
@R(kt+1)
@kt+1
 @kt+1
@gt| {z }
(R.1)
+
(!p+ 1 + n) 
gt
+ (1 + n)p
@gt+1
@kt+1
 @kt+1
@gt
= 0;
bt+1 : (1 + n)(1 + p)
@(1  t)wt
@bt+1
+ p
@R(kt+1)
@kt+1
 @kt+1
@bt+1| {z }
(R.2)
+ (1 + n)p
@gt+1
@bt+1
= 0;
where the terms (R.1) and (R.2) indicate the eects through the interest rate. The term
(R.1) shows the marginal benet of public spending through the interest rate. A higher
level of public spending places a larger tax burden on the young, which creates a negative
income eect on saving and capital accumulation. A decrease in capital increases the
marginal productivity of capital, gross interest rate, and thus return from saving. This
is an additional marginal benet of public spending. The term (R.2) shows the marginal
benet of government debt through the interest rate. A higher level of government debt
crowds out capital accumulation, which creates an additional marginal benet of govern-
ment debt as a result of an increase in the interest rate. These two benets, peculiar
to the model with the neoclassical production function, are abstracted from the analysis
based on AK technology.
7 Concluding Remarks
How does intergenerational conict on scal policy aect public spending and economic
growth through voting? How does the issuance of government debt inuence scal policy
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and economic growth? What is the normative implication of the political equilibrium
outcome? This study attempted to answer these questions by adopting an overlapping-
generations model in which public spending is nanced by tax and the issuance of gov-
ernment debt. In addition, scal policy is decided by probabilistic voting that captures
intergenerational conict.
The ndings of the present study are threefold. First, population aging incentivizes
the government to invest more in capital for future public spending, positively aect-
ing economic growth. Second, when the government borrows in the capital market, the
introduction of the balanced budget rule results in a higher growth rate. In addition,
under plausible conditions, voters prefer the balanced budget scenario to the unbalanced
budget scenario when the budget rule is also decided by voting. Third, we compare the
political equilibrium outcome with the Ramsey allocation in which an innitely lived plan-
ner commits to all his or her future policy choices and nd that the Ramsey allocation
might feature less growth and more borrowing than the political equilibrium if the planner
attaches low weights to future generations.
The main contribution of this study is that it demonstrates the growth and the nor-
mative implication of the issuance of government debt in the presence of intergenerational
conict on scal policy. Such implications have not been fully examined in previous stud-
ies (Cukierman and Meltzer, 1989; Rohrs, 2010; Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti, 2012;
Arai and Naito, 2014). To demonstrate the implications, this study relies on a logarith-
mic utility function, simple AK technology, and inelastic labor supply. These assumptions
thus enable us to solve the model in a tractable way.
In addition to the aforementioned points, the present study made the following as-
sumptions. First, it assumed a closed economy with a constant interest rate stemming
from simple AK technology. Allowing for government spending on infrastructure as in
Barro (1990) or on public education as in Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) would enable us
to demonstrate a more realistic scenario of scal policy and its eect on economic growth.
Second, we assumed no altruism toward children. With some weight placed on chil-
dren's welfare, the old care about the future tax burden, which may have an additional
eect on the choice of scal policy by the government, as demonstrated by Cukierman and
Meltzer (1989) and discussed by Beauchemin (1998). Third, we assumed no pay-as-you-
go (PAYG) pension provision for the old. Although pension and debt are economically
equivalent (Barro, 1974), the introduction of a PAYG pension as an alternative to gov-
ernment debt might be expected to result in a dierent equilibrium allocation. However,
these eects are omitted from the analysis here and are left to future work.
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A Proofs
Recall that R = A holds in the equilibrium. In the following series of proofs, we often
use R instead of A to remind readers of the importance of the term Rb in the equations.
A.1 Reformulation of the Problem
First, we substitute the government budget constraint (1 + n)b0 + (1   )Ak = (p +
1 + n)g=(1 + n) + Rb into the capital market clearing condition (1 + n)(k0 + b0) =
(p=(1 + p)) (1  )(1  )Ak to replace  by k; b and b0
(1 + n)(k0 + b0) =
p
1 + p

(1  )Ak   p+ 1 + n
1 + n
g  Rb+ (1 + n)b0

:
This expression is reformulated as follows:
(1 + n)b0 =
p
1 + p

(1  )Ak   p+ 1 + n
1 + n
g  Rb

  1 + n
(1  )A f(1  )Ak
0  Rb0g
  1 + n
(1  )A

Rb0   (1  )A p
1 + p
b0

:
We then move the third term on the right-hand side to the left-hand side and rearrange
the terms to obtain
(1 + n)b0 =

p
1 + p

((1  )Ak  Rb)  p+ 1 + n
1 + n
g

  1 + n
(1  )A f(1  )Ak
0  Rb0g



R
(1  )A +
1
1 + p
 1
: (9)
Next, we rewrite the indirect utility function of the young, V y = (1+p) ln(1  )(1 
)Ak +  ln g + p ln g0; as follows:
V y = (1 + p) ln

((1  )Ak  Rb)  p+ 1 + n
1 + n
g + (1 + n)b0

+  ln g + p ln g0
= (1 + p) ln

((1  )Ak  Rb)  p+ 1 + n
1 + n
g +

p
1 + p

((1  )Ak  Rb)  p+ 1 + n
1 + n
g

  1 + n
(1  )A f(1  )Ak
0  Rb0g



R
(1  )A +
1
1 + p
 1#
+  ln g + p ln g0;
where the rst equality comes from substituting in the government budget constraint and
the second equality comes from substituting in (9). The above expression is rewritten as
V y = (1 + p) ln

R
(1  )A + 1

((1  )Ak  Rb)  p+ 1 + n
1 + n
g

  1 + n
(1  )A f(1  )Ak
0  Rb0g

+  ln g + p ln g0:
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By using R = A; the term R=(1   )A + 1 is rewritten as 1=(1   ). Therefore, the
above expression is reduced to
V y = (1 + p) ln

A

((1  )Ak  Rb)  p+ 1 + n
1 + n
g

  (1 + n) ((1  )Ak0  Rb0)

+  ln g + p ln g0; (10)
where constant terms are omitted from the expression.
By using (10) and x  (1   )Ak   Rb; the political objective function is now given
by

 (x; g; x0; g0) = (1 + n)(1 + p) ln

A(x  p+ 1 + n
1 + n
g)  (1 + n)x0

+ (!p+ 1 + n) ln g + (1 + n)p ln g0;
where the unrelated terms are omitted from the expression. Since the capital market
clearing condition and government budget constraint are included in 
 (x; g; x0; g0), the
problem is now to maximize 
 (x; g; x0; g0), subject to g0 = G(k; b) and given x; k and b.
Therefore, the problem in Denition 2(ii) is reformulated as in the statement in (4), if we
assume G(k; b) = G(x)  G ((1  )Ak  Rb).

A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Consider the reformulated problem demonstrated in (4). Given the guess of g0 = GDebt x0,
we obtain the following rst-order conditions with respect to x0 and g :
x0 : (1 + n)(1 + p)
1 + n
A(x  p+1+n
1+n
g)  (1 + n)x0 =
(1 + n)p
x0
; (11)
g : (1 + n)(1 + p)
A
A(x  p+1+n
1+n
g)  (1 + n)x0 =
(!p+ 1 + n)
g
: (12)
Conditions (11) and (12) lead to the following relation between g and x0
g =
(!p+ 1 + n)(1 + n)
pA(p+ 1 + n)
x0: (13)
Substituting (13) into (11) leads to the following optimality condition for x0
x0 =
pA
(1 + n) f1 + p(1 + )g+ (!p+ 1 + n)x: (14)
With (13) and (14), the optimality condition for g becomes
g =
1 + n
p+ 1 + n
 (!p+ 1 + n)
(1 + n) (1 + p(1 + )) + (!p+ 1 + n)
x: (15)
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Therefore, the function g0 = GDebt  x0 constitutes a stationary Markov-perfect political
equilibrium as long as the following holds:
GDebt =
1 + n
p+ 1 + n
 (!p+ 1 + n)
(1 + n) (1 + p(1 + )) + (!p+ 1 + n)
:
To nd the policy functions B(k; b) and T (k; b), recall the capital market clearing
condition and government budget constraint given by
(1 + n)(k0 + b0) =
p
1 + p
(1  )(1  )Ak; (16)
(1 + n)b0 + (1  )Ak = p+ 1 + n
1 + n
g +Rb; (17)
respectively. Given k and b, the four variables, g; k0; b0 and  , are determined by (14),
(15), (16), and (17).
Substituting (15) and (17) into (16) leads to
(1 )Ak0 = p
1 + p
 f1 + p(1 + )g (1  )A
(1 + n) (1 + p(1 + )) + (!p+ 1 + n)
f(1  )Ak  Rbg (1  )A
1 + p
b0:
(18)
We substitute (18) into (14) and rearrange the terms to obtain the policy function B(k; b)
b0 = B(k; b)  p
1 + p
 (1   + p)   (1 + p(1 + ))
(1 + n) (1 + p(1 + )) + (!p+ 1 + n)
 f(1  )Ak  Rbg :
(19)
By using (18) and (19), we obtain the law of the motion of capital as follows:
k0 =
p
1 + p
  +  (1 + p(1 + ))
(1 + n) (1 + p(1 + )) + (!p+ 1 + n)
 f(1  )Ak  Rbg : (20)
Here, (19) and (20) imply that b0=Ak0 is constant across periods after period 1:
b0
Ak0
=
(1   + p)   (1 + p(1 + ))
A f +  (1 + p(1 + ))g 8t  1:
Given k0 > 0, this equation states that b0 ? 0 holds if and only if  7 (1   + p)=f1 +
p(1 + )g.
To determine the policy function T (k; b), recall the government budget constraint (17),
which is rewritten as
(1  )Ak = p+ 1 + n
1 + n
g +Rb  (1 + n)b0
=
(!p+ 1 + n)
(1 + n) (1 + p(1 + )) + (!p+ 1 + n)
 f(1  )Ak  Rbg+Rb
  (1 + n) p
1 + p
 (1   + p)   (1 + p(1 + ))
(1 + n) (1 + p(1 + )) + (!p+ 1 + n)
 f(1  )Ak  Rbg ;
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where the second equality is derived from (15) and (19).
By dividing both sides by (1  )Ak and rearranging the terms, we obtain
 = T (k; b)  (!p+ 1 + n)   (1 + n)
p
1+p
f(1   + p)   (1 + p(1 + ))g
(1 + n) (1 + p(1 + )) + (!p+ 1 + n)
+
(1 + n) (1 + p(1 + )) + (1 + n) p
1+p
f(1   + p)   (1 + p(1 + ))g
(1 + n) (1 + p(1 + )) + (!p+ 1 + n)
 
1   
b
k
;
(21)
where
b
k
=
(
b0
k0
for t = 0;
(1 +p) (1+p(1+))
+(1+p(1+))
for t  1: (22)
The remaining task is to show that g > 0 and  < 1 hold 8t  0: In period 0, given
k0(> 0), b0 must satisfy (1   )Ak0   Rb0 > 0 and T (k0; b0) < 1: Both conditions are
reduced to b0 < (1  )k0=.
Next, consider g in period t  1. Equation (15) implies that g > 0 holds if and only
if (1  )  b=k > 0 holds. Given (22), the necessary and sucient condition for g > 0
in period t  1 becomes (1 + p) > 0, which holds for any set of parameters.
Finally, consider  in period t  1. We substitute (22) into (21) and rearrange the
terms to obtain
 < 1, (1 + n) 
26664(1 + p(1 + )) + p1 + p f(1   + p)   (1 + p(1 + ))g| {z }
(A.1)
37775

26664 1    (1   + p)   (1 + p(1 + )) +  (1 + p(1 + ))   1| {z }
(A.2)
37775 < 0;
(23)
where the sign of the term (A.1) is positive and the sign of the term (A.2) is negative.
Therefore, the condition (23) holds for any set of parameters.

A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
(i) Recall the law of the motion of capital demonstrated in Proposition 1. Given the initial
condition b0 (< (1  )k0=), the growth rate of capital in period 0, k1=k0, is immediately
computed as demonstrated in Proposition 2(i).
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Next, recall the law of the motion of capital in period t  1. Dividing both sides of
the equation by kt leads to
kt+1
kt
=
p
1 + p
  +  (1 + p(1 + ))
(1 + n)(1 + p(1 + )) + (!p+ 1 + n)


(1  )  bt
kt

A:
The substitution of the ratio bt=kt shown in Proposition 1 into the above expression leads
to
kt+1
kt
=
xt+1
xt
=
p
(1 + n)(1 + p(1 + )) + (!p+ 1 + n)
A for t  1:
(ii) The eect of a lower population growth rate is immediate from the expression
k1=k0 and kt+1=kt(t  1) in Proposition 2(i).
(iii) To show the eect of greater longevity, recall the growth rate of capital for t  1,
which is reformulated as
kt+1
kt
=

(1 + n)

1
p
+ (1 + )

+

! + 1+n
p


A:
This indicates that @ (kt+1=kt) =@p > 0 holds for t  1.
The dierentiation of k1=k0 with respect to p yields
(1 + p)2 f(1 + n)(1 + p(1 + )) + (!p+ 1 + n)g2 

(1  )  b0
k0

A
 1
 @ (k1=k0)
@p
=  f +  (1 + p(1 + ))g (1 + p) f(1 + n)(1 + p(1 + )) + (!p+ 1 + n)g| {z }
(B1)
+ p(1 + )(1 + p) f(1 + n)(1 + p(1 + )) + (!p+ 1 + n)g| {z }
(B2)
  p f + (1 + p(1 + ))g f(1 + n)(1 + p(1 + )) + (!p+ 1 + n)g| {z }
(B3)
  p f +  (1 + p(1 + ))g (1 + p) f(1 + n)(1 + ) + !g| {z }
(B4)
:
Here,
(B2)  (B3) = pp(1  ) f(1 + n)(1 + p(1 + )) + (!p+ 1 + n)g > 0;
(B1)  (B4) =  f + (1 + p(1 + ))g (1 + p)(1 + n)(1 + ) > 0:
Therefore, we obtain @ (k1=k0) =@p > 0.

27
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
To solve the problem, we conjecture the following linear policy function:
gt+1 = GBalanced  f(1  )Akt+1  Rbt+1g ;
where GBalanced 2 (0;1) is a constant parameter. Under this conjecture and the capital
market clearing condition (8), we can reformulate the problem as
max
fgtg
(1 + n) f1 + p(1 + )g ln

(1  )Akt  Rbt   p+ 1 + n
1 + n
gt

+ (!p+ 1 + n) ln gt;
where bt = 0 for t  1.
Solving this problem leads to the following policy function:
gt =
1 + n
p+ 1 + n
 (!p+ 1 + n)
(1 + n) f1 + p(1 + )g+ (!p+ 1 + n) f(1  )Akt  Rbtg :
This function constitutes a Markov-perfect political equilibrium as long as
GBalanced =
1 + n
p+ 1 + n
 (!p+ 1 + n)
(1 + n) f1 + p(1 + )g+ (!p+ 1 + n) = GDebt:
By using the policy function of gt and government budget constraint, we can compute the
tax rate as follows:
t =
p+1+n
1+n
gt +Rbt
(1  )Akt
=
(!p+ 1 + n) + (1 + n) f1 + p(1 + )g Rbt
(1 )Akt
(1 + n) f1 + p(1 + )g+ (!p+ 1 + n) ;
where bt = 0 for t  1. Finally, we substitute the policy function of gt into the constraint
(8) to obtain the law of the motion of capital as presented in Proposition 3.
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A.5 Ramsey Allocation
We rst solve the functional equation for t  1. We make the guess V (x0) = v0 + v1 lnx0,
where v0 and v1 are undetermined coecients. For this guess, the recursive formulation
of the problem is
v(x) = max
fg;x0g

(1 + n)(1 + p) ln

A

x  p+ 1 + n
1 + n
g

  (1 + n)x0

+

p

+ 1 + n

 ln g + (1 + n)  (v0 + v1 lnx0)

:
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Solving this functional equation leads to
g =
1+n
p+1+n

p

+ 1 + n


(1 + n)(1 + p) +

p

+ 1 + n

 + (1 + n)v1
x;
x0 =
v1A
(1 + n)(1 + p) +

p

+ 1 + n

 + (1 + n)v1
x:
Substituting these into the recursive formulation gives
v(x) = (const) +

(1 + n)(1 + p) +

p

+ 1 + n

 + (1 + n)v1

lnx;
where (const) is the term including the constant terms. The guess is veried if v1 =
(1+n)(1+ p)+ (p=+1+n)+ (1+n)v1 and v0 = (const). Therefore, v1 is given by
v1 =
(1 + n)(1 + p) +

p

+ 1 + n


1  (1 + n) ;
and the corresponding policy functions of x0 and g are given as follows:
x0 = Ax; (24)
g =
f1  (1 + n)g 1+n
p+1+n

p

+ 1 + n


(1 + n)(1 + p) +

p

+ 1 + n


x: (25)
Next, we consider the problem in period 0. By using the aforementioned result, the
functional equation in period 0 is written as
~V (x0) = maxfg0;x1g

(1 + n)(1 + p) ln

A

x0   p+ 1 + n
1 + n
g0

  (1 + n)x1

+(p+ 1 + n) ln g0 + (1 + n)v0 + (1 + n)v1 lnx1] :
Solving this functional equation leads to the following policy functions in period 0:
g0 =
(1  (1 + n)) (1 + n)
(1 + n)(1 + p) + (1 + n)

p

+ 1 + n

 + (p+ 1 + n) (1  (1 + n))
x0;
x1 =
n
(1 + n)(1 + p) +

p

+ 1 + n


o
A
(1 + n)(1 + p) + (1 + n)

p

+ 1 + n

 + (p+ 1 + n) (1  (1 + n))
x0:
Policy Functions of k0 and b0
To nd the policy functions of b0 and k0 in period t( 1), recall the capital market
clearing condition and government budget constraint. Together, they are put into the
following condition:
(1 + n)(k0 + b0) =
p
1 + p

(1  )Ak   p+ 1 + n
1 + n
g  Rb+ (1 + n)b0

:
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By substituting the policy function of g in (25) into the above expression, we obtain
1 + n
1 + p
b0 =
p
1 + p

(1 + n)(1 + p) + (1 + n)

p

+ 1 + n


(1 + n)(1 + p) +

p

+ 1 + n


f(1  )Ak  Rbg (1+n)b0:
From this and (24), we obtain the policy functions of k0 and b0 in period t( 1) as follows:
k0 =
"

1   +

1  

(1 + n)

1
1 + p
+

1  
 1
 
#
 f(1  )Ak  Rbg ; (26)
b0 =

(1 + n)

1
1 + p
+

1  
 1
   f(1  )Ak  Rbg ; (27)
where
  p
1 + p

(1 + n)(1 + p) + (1 + n)

p

+ 1 + n


(1 + n)(1 + p) +

p

+ 1 + n


  (1 + n) 
1  :
Following the same manner, we obtain the policy functions of k1 and b1 as follows:
k1 =
"
	0 +

1  

(1 + n)

1
1 + p
+

1  
 1
 0
#
 f(1  )Ak0  Rb0g ; (28)
b1 =

(1 + n)

1
1 + p
+

1  
 1
 0  f(1  )Ak0  Rb0g ; (29)
where
0 
p
1+p

h
(1 + n)(1 + p) + (1 + n)

p

+ 1 + n


i
  1+n
1 
h
(1 + n)(1 + p) +

p

+ 1 + n


i
(1 + n)(1 + p) + (1 + n)

p

+ 1 + n

 + (p+ 1 + n)(1  (1 + n))
;
	0 

1 
h
(1 + n)(1 + p) +

p

+ 1 + n


i
(1 + n)(1 + p) + (1 + n)

p

+ 1 + n

 + (p+ 1 + n)(1  (1 + n))
:
Growth Rates
Given k0 and b0, the growth rate in period 1, k1=k0, is immediately obtained from
(28). To compute the growth rate in period t  2, recall that the following holds from
(26):
kt+1
kt
=
"

1   +

1  

(1 + n)

1
1 + p
+

1  
 1
 
#


(1  )A Rbt
kt

:
We can compute the growth rate in period 2, k2=k1, by substituting (28) and (29) into
the above expression, and the growth rate in period t ( 3) by substituting (26) and (27)
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into the above expression. In particular, the growth rate in period t ( 3) is given by
kt+1=kt = A.
State of the Financial Balance
Recall (29) that presents the policy function of b1. By using (29), we can determine
the state of the nancial balance in period 0 as b1 ? 0 , 0 ? 0. For t  1, the state
of the nancial balance is determined by using (27): b0 ? 0 ,  ? 0. The condition for
period t  1 is reformulated as follows:
b0 ? 0,  ? 0,  7
p
h
1  

1
1    p1+p
i
(1 + n)
h
p
1  + 

1
1    p1+p
i :

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Figure 1: The horizontal axis is  and the vertical axis is 
. The solid curve shows the
value of 
 for the unbalanced budget case and the dotted curve shows the value of 
 for
the balanced budget case. The vertical line is the critical value of  that distinguishes
the state of the nancial balance.
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